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Abstract 
Pouvwa pou Pèp La: 
Non-governmental Organizations and Community 
Engagement in Haiti
Wideleine Desir, MSCRP 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
Supervisor:  Bjorn Sletto 
For decades, numerous NGOs, foreign and local, have implemented hundreds of projects in 
Haiti. I have interviewed a variety of NGOs working in Haiti to learn more about the methods 
used to connect communities and local government with projects in order to foster governance 
and organizing capacities. From local to foreign, small to large, every NGO documented here 
experienced different opportunities and barriers when working with community members and 
local governments on the implementation of projects. The following Professional Report 
identifies important and successful community engagement practices pursued by NGOs, but also 
reveals the lack of capacity building methods used in the projects described here. Based on 
previous academic research in the field of disaster relief and the interviews conducted, I 
conclude by providing recommendations for better engaging communities in an effort to build 
capacity within local Haitian communities and within the Haitian government.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the small nation of Haiti. Devastating 
the country, the earthquake caused an estimated 30,000 deaths, displaced over a million 
people, and leveled many structures near the epicenter. Centered near the city of 
Leogane--only 10 miles from the capital--the earthquake ravaged the densest parts of the 
country, destroying private homes and most of the key government offices, including the 
National Palace. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) named the earthquake 
the most destructive event the country had ever experienced in recent times due to the 
sheer number of deaths and destruction. Although a 7.0 on the Richter scale is high, there 
have been stronger earthquakes in the past that did not create as much mayhem as the 
2010 earthquake created. For example, in 1960, Chile had a 9.5 magnitude earthquake 
that directly killed 4,485 people; and in 2004, an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.1 was 
felt across 14 different Asian countries, directly killing 230,000 people. The impacts of 
other natural disasters are not listed to compare tragedy with tragedy, but to shed light on 
how terribly unprepared Haiti is in the face of natural disasters.  
Unfortunately, in addition to earthquakes, the western side of Hispaniola is no 
stranger to natural disasters of other kinds. During the 2008 hurricane season, the nation 
was hit by four hurricanes: Fay, Gustav, Hannah, and Ike. In 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2007, 
Haiti’s agricultural land was destroyed by constant flooding. And after the 2010 
earthquake, Haiti continued to endure more hurricanes. However, while Haiti cannot 
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avoid natural disasters due to its location in hurricane and earthquake zones, its ability to 
recover after natural disasters has not improved in the past decades. This coupling of 
Haiti as a regular target of hurricanes with its status as one of the poorest and 
less-developed nations in the world has made the country a focus of the efforts of 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Even before the 2010 earthquake, the North 
American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) conservatively estimated that over 
10,000 NGOs were working in Haiti.  
Figure 1: Haiti earthquake of 2010 Source: Britannica 
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NGO interest ​i​n Haiti began in the 1970s but took off in earnest in the 1990s 
during the presidential administration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. It is not a coincidence 
that this great influx of NGOs to the country began during the second United States 
occupation of Haiti in 1994. During the years since U.S. troops left Haitian soil, NGOs 
have assumed much of the regular governance functions in the country and contributed to 
a continued weakening of the Haitian government. In an effort to curb “corruption”, the 
Haitian government has largely been excluded from directly receiving aid funding. After 
the earthquake, in an act of global kindness, over $13 billion dollars from private citizens 
and nations was pledged to help Haiti rebuild, but the Haitian government received less 
than one cent of every dollar pledged to assist the country. According to the Associated 
Press, after the 2010 earthquake, disaster assistance NGOs received 43 cents per dollar 
while the U.S. military received 33 cents of every dollar donated by the United States 
(2010) .While the proliferation of NGOs would appear to be a boon for Haiti, and it has 
indeed helped many in need, the influx of NGOs has also served to reproduce colonial 
relations of inequality and foreign occupation and failed to strengthen local governance 
capacity. As much as 70% of NGO funding comes from national funding agencies in the 
Global North while only 30% comes from private donors. It is an unwelcome truth for the 
first sovereign black republic that over 70% of the nation's services are provided by 
NGOs, and 70% of NGO funding comes from Northern states such as the United States, 
Canada, and France. 
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After the 2010 earthquake, many foreign NGOs worked together to tackle 
different crisis. The United Nations Logistical Base or ‘Log Base” served as a meeting 
ground for foreign aid providers. The Log Base was a city within a city created for the 
comfort of foreign agencies. With flower-lined walkways, international cuisine at the 
ready, and the American dollar as its currency, Log Base served as the coordination site 
for over 70 agencies at its peak. The paradox presented by this site within a poor and 
ravaged city led me to begin researching the roles that foreign aid agencies play in Haiti. 
My preliminary research showed me that in order for international NGOs to create 
impactful and sustainable projects, agencies must reassess and reconfigure their current 
methods of relationship building with Haitian communities, government agencies and 
organizations. This initial research led me to my overarching research question: How do 
NGOs build relationships with communities and other stakeholders to curate local 
investment, empower community members, and develop impactful and sustainable 
projects? In this context, the concept of sustainability refers to the projects’ ability to 
continue without the support of the original funding NGO. This overarching research 
question is answered through the investigation of three primary questions:  
1. What methods -past and present- have NGOs utilized when working in
communities?
2. What roles do local residents, government officials, and aid agencies play to
support each other's goals?
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3. Who decides if a project is ‘well done’?
Although the majority of my interviews were conducted remotely via Skype, I
spent five weeks in two of Haiti’s most populous cities, Jacmel and Petion Ville, during 
the winter of 2017. During my stay, I had the opportunity to hear different perspectives 
from locals, businessmen, and NGO staff members about the work NGOs are doing in 
Haiti. Instead of focusing on one specific sector, such as infrastructure, education or 
economic development, I chose to interview representatives from a range of 
organizations of different size in order to document the great variety of interests and 
goals that exist in the non-profit community in Haiti. The NGOs I investigated ranged 
from small grassroots groups such as Anseye Pou Ayiti, to larger organizations with 
international connections such as World Neighbors, to large agencies backed by powerful 
governments. The agencies I interviewed and their areas of focus are as follows: 
● Founded in 2009, Anseye Pou Ayiti (APA) is a ​movement ​supported by a staff of
about a twelve. This local Haitian-led NGO currently works within underserved
rural communities to raise the level of education available to children. Unlike
many other NGOs, APA does not build schools, instead they partner with local
communities to train exceptional teachers through a two-year fellowship to work
within the local school system.
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● The internationally known, United Nations (UN) Habitat was established in 1975
to “deal with the rapid and often uncontrolled growth of cities” (UN Habitat,
2012). Since 2008, UN Habitat has collaborated on over a dozen projects within
Haiti with other high profile partners such as the US Army, multiple ministries,
and many other UN offices on the island, including the United Nation
Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Institute of Training and
Research (UNITR). UN Habitat was by far the largest agency that I spoke with.
Between 2008 and 2015, UN Habitat invested over $23 million dollars on 12
projects throughout the country, mostly to support recovery after the 2010
earthquake.
● Originally founded in 1955 as Medicine for Missions, the Seattle based NGO
World Concern has worked in Haiti for over 30 years. The organization supports
communities by providing educational services, microcredit loans, programs to
foster food security, and disaster risk reduction. According to their website, World
Concern has a staff of 613 people throughout 15 countries.
● With a small Haitian-led team of about five, World Neighbors is the smallest
NGO I spoke with. The small team works to create saving and credit groups,
provide fishing training, and disaster preparedness training (World Neighbors,
2017). Although it is based in Oklahoma City, World Neighbors predominantly
staffs field teams with local residents from the areas they are serving.
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Before entering this discussion, my only interaction with NGOs was through 
academic textbooks and news reports. In an NPR news report published in 2015, the Red 
Cross was unable to detail how it spent the $500 million USD the organization had raised 
for the 2010 Haitian earthquake relief. The Red Cross had also overestimated the number 
of people who had received assistance and overstated the impact of their projects. In 
reality, a full one-third of the funds had gone to administrative cost and fees paid to both 
the Red Cross and foreign agencies that had been recruited to do the relief work. After 
hearing about this funding mismanagement, I wanted to learn more about the motivations 
and structural forces driving the work of NGOs. Throughout my time researching and 
interviewing NGO representatives about their perspectives and strategies regarding 
community engagement, community partnering and community ownership, I found 
myself increasingly focused on the issue of capacity building. After learning more about 
the projects that had been introduced into the communities and the relationships that had 
been formed (or perhaps dismissed) in the process, I understood that although 
organizations prioritized capacity building in the communities they served, their success 
was mixed. Furthermore, very few organizations were concerned about building the 
capacity of the local government.  
In my meetings with agencies, I was interested in learning more about their 
methods for working with communities and their personal perspective on their work. 
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While I was armed with a host of questions, I enjoyed letting the speakers decide what 
direction they wanted the conversation to go. Some spoke freely with little prompting 
from me, while others were more guarded and less forthcoming about their agencies’ 
practice. Every interview began with the same request, “tell me about how you found 
yourself in this role and what your organization does”. The questions that followed were: 
● How do you select the communities you work with?
● How do you enter communities?
● What role do community members play in the implementation of your projects?
● Where/when is the government involved in the project?
● When/how do you leave these communities?
I ended every interview with the same question, “do you have any advice for other 
agencies working in Haiti?” This question was by far my favorite since it allowed the 
agencies to imagine future improvements without seeming malicious or confrontational. 
The greatest barrier to my research was a lack of time. With only five weeks at 
my disposal, it was incredibly difficult to arrange site visits to speak with staff members. 
While there is mass transit throughout the capital in the form of ‘tap taps’-eccentrically 
decorated privately owned automobiles that operate together to form a mass transit 
network--many agencies worked in rural parts of the country only accessible by an 
hour-long ride in a personal vehicle. My research and the academic community would 
have benefited from more time to conduct a thorough ethnographic study of the role of 
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NGOs in Haiti. Also, while I was given the opportunity to speak with a variety of NGO 
staff members, it was impossible to approach all NGOs working in the country, nor was it 
possible to delve into the perspectives of government officials and local community 
members. I hope that the future researchers will conduct more in-depth research on the 
role of NGOs in shaping the future of Haiti.  
The first chapter of my PR examines the current literature on NGOs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean to describe more broadly the history and influence of NGOs 
on governance in the region. Chapter Two examines foreign intervention in Haiti, which 
provides a broader understanding of the role and rationales of NGOs working in the 
country today. The chapter review the major political moments in Haiti, allowing the 
reader to gain a better understanding of some of the principal events that have contributed 
to shaping the nation as it is today. In Chapter Three, I present my findings, focusing 
primarily on the community engagement methods employed by the different agencies 
investigated. Finally, in Chapter Four I discuss the past and present of NGOs within Haiti 
and introduce recommendations for the future. In this chapter, I highlight some of the 
best methods that foreign aid agencies, local nonprofits, the government, and community 
members of the community have developed in the field. Finally, in the Conclusion, I sum 
up my work by recommending some action items that may lead to the more sustainable 
and long-term projects in Haiti.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
DONORS VS. BENEFICIARIES: 
 REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE 
When critically looking at the work of NGOs globally—in particular foreign or 
international NGOs (INGOs)—we have to consider the logic of their decision making. In 
the past decades the NGO sector has morphed from a charitable institution into a 
“professionalized aid sector,” creating a disconnection between those who fund, those 
who serve, and those in need (Pearce, 2010). With large aid agencies such as the Red 
Cross, Oxfam International, and the United Nations funding hundreds of projects across 
the world totaling billions of dollar, they find it increasingly important to satisfy the 
interests of their donors, perhaps at the expense of those they seek to serve. Some critics 
have commented that the shift from working to make a change to working to please 
donors has created an aid sector that views charity and goodwill as a “commodity” 
(Edmonds, 2012).  
One major issue that has arisen from aid agencies’ prioritizing donor happiness 
over supporting beneficiaries is the increasing competition between agencies throughout 
the sector. Globally, NGOs have shifted their focus from creating change to staying alive 
in an industry that gets more congested year after year. In order to stand out from other 
agencies and secure funding, agencies increasingly find it necessary to create projects 
that catch the eyes of donors, to work in isolation, and to “mark their territories” with 
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welcome signs (Panda, 2007; Schuller, 2009; Edmonds, 2012). In the context of Haiti, 
this type of competition among aid agencies has left the country as a “vast cemetery of 
projects” (Schoneberg, 2016). When aid organizations are constantly working to secure 
funding, projects are increasingly shaped to serve the whims of donors, whether this is 
providing clean drinking water, developing early childhood literacy programs, or 
implementing micro loan programs. Though all of the previously mentioned projects are 
all morally good and in many places helpful to residents in need, when conducted under 
the pressure of donors these projects are sometimes ill-advised and inappropriate. Donors 
are often short-sighted and ill-informed about the purpose and context of projects, and by 
catering to the wants of donors, agencies begin to shift their perspective away from the 
needs of their beneficiaries. Ultimately, they effectively become accountable to their 
donors, not to their beneficiaries (Edmond 2012). 
This type of accountability has been referred to as “upward accountability”: 
instead of being solely accountable to the communities they serve, agencies feel more 
accountability to those funding their initiatives (Chynoweth, S. K., Zwi, A. B., & 
Whelan, A. K., 2018). This type of accountability is revealed through the traditional 
marketing materials produced by NGOs, for example through websites that show the 
happy communities served or reports with a focus on the number of people “helped”. In 
worst-case situations, community members and governments are more affected by 
decisions of omnipresent donors than aid staff on the ground. Ultimately, this situation 
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has created tension between the aid industry and those it serves, leading scholars to call 
for a restructuring of the relationship between donors and aid agencies in an attempt to 
reduce the power wielded by donors.  
POWER RELATIONS 
INGOs vs Local NGOs 
However, even though field staff is not always in control of the decisions being 
made under the influence of donors, it is necessary to consider what power field staff in 
fact do have, and how they wield this power. Even though their projects might be steered 
by donors, NGO staff—and particularly INGO staff--become vested with more authority 
once they begin working in communities. Throughout the past decade, INGOs have 
become perhaps the most influential source of civil service employment and funding for 
many nations, to the point that, in the words of some scholars, INGOs effectively “own” 
the situation in places such as Haiti (Buss, 2015). In the case of Haiti, INGOs have 
carved out a very powerful role for themselves. The foreign aid money that has 
accompanied INGOs throughout Haiti creates a power dynamic that influences every 
relationship that the agency has (Schoneberg, 2016). As a result, the relationships birthed 
by the foreign aid industry have created tensions between local agencies and INGOs and 
a corresponding power struggle between the Haitian government and INGOs.  
12 
With INGOs receiving the bulk of the aid destined for Haiti, tensions have also 
emerged between local Haitian-led non-profits and large foreign aid agencies 
(Ramachandran & Walz, 2015). According to Ramachandran and Walz, after the 2010 
earthquake, Haitian-led NGOs received only $0.8 million of the reported $9 billion 
dollars donated to Haiti after the disaster. Why Haitian-led organizations were only given 
.04% of the original $5.4 million they requested has not been determined. From an 
outsider perspective, this type of conscious exclusion can be seen as distrust of 
Haitian-led organizations’ ability to handle money, or distrust of Haitian-led 
organizations’ ability to create outputs on the same scale and same level of quality as 
foreign agencies. More research is needed into the reasoning behind the distribution of 
funds immediately after the 2010 earthquake and since.  
Widening the rift between INGOs and local NGOs is the different understandings 
of collaboration between NGOs at different ‘levels’. Local nonprofit staff members have 
reported feeling ignored or demeaned by INGOs for not having formal university 
degrees. Local staff members feel that INGO staff create a space where degrees are 
prioritized over local knowledge, established relationships with communities, lived 
experiences, and manpower (Chynoweth et al., 2015). This atmosphere stifles the ability 
of both parties to collaborate and design impactful solutions: without the space to have a 
dialogue and critically consider the methods to be used, the communities in need 
eventually become the real losers. In order to continue their mission, many local NGOs 
13 
have resolved to fit in wherever they can and adapt to the uneven relations of power with 
INGO staff. For example, local NGO staff members will endure working group meetings 
despite feeling “estranged” and “unappreciated” by international staff (Chynoweth et al., 
2015). On the other hand, INGO staff members remark on how they are “seeking equal 
and balanced relationships” and that any intimidation of local groups is “unintentional” 
(Chynoweth et al., 2015; Schoneberg, 2016). However, even if INGO staff members do 
not seek to intimidate staff members of local NGOs, the question remains whether they 
completely understand the impact of their decisions on the communities where they 
work, and if they are able to make a long-lasting and positive impact in those 
communities? 
INGOs vs State (Local) Government 
While the power INGOs have over local NGOs is openly discussed by staff 
members of local NGOs, the power INGOs carry with the Haitian government is less 
openly acknowledged. It has been argued that the mere presence of NGOs in a 
community begins to weaken local governance structures. Before beginning a single 
project, INGOs have the capability to “disempower local actors and weaken existing 
national structures,” usually creating new problems in an effort to solve other problems 
(Schoneberg, 2016). Whether INGOs are in Haiti with the government’s ‘blessing’ or 
not, as the provider of over 70% of the nation’s social services they are more influential 
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and in some cases seen as stronger than the government. Around 2008, INGOs assumed 
even more power when, after a three-year strategic plan pursued by the Haitian 
government had failed to create the expected outcomes, the UN decided to begin 
coordinating “the work of all stakeholders in peacekeeping” (Zanotti, 2010). While the 
lack of coordination on part of the national government has long been a concern for the 
development community, this decision led to a form of quasi-government under the 
auspices of the UN.  
One of the major concerns regarding the relationship between INGOs and the 
Haitian government is the precedent that INGOs is setting for the government. Without 
the ability to govern, the Haitian government will continue to be crippled by foreign aid 
agencies. Foreign aid has become so ingrained in the way that the Haitian government 
operates that officials have become as reliant on NGOs providing services as much as the 
locals who receive the service. For example, the government fails to maintain proper 
public schools or hospitals with the knowledge that community members can choose 
from several NGO operated schools and hospitals. As Schuller suggests, “Southern states 
[have] not eroded as much as they have transformed to support neoliberal interests” 
(2009). This attitude of needing to please NGOs--particularly INGOs--leads local 
government officials to work as hard as possible to ensure that NGO employees feel 
comfortable (Pierre-Louis, 2011). This need to please NGOs has been learned from long 
experience, but it comes at a cost. Because of this dependency, the ‘Republic of NGOs’ is 
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thrown into chaos if nations refuse to fund foreign aid, as was the case in the 1990s when 
foreign aid was canceled after the election of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Such 
manipulation of foreign aid has long been a favored tactic among developed nations to 
maintain oversight and political control over receiving nations. Once again echoing the 
sentiment of critics, INGOs truly do “own” the situation in Haiti (Buss, 2015). One thing 
that everyone can agree on is that no matter where they came from, who sent them, or 
whether they can be controlled, NGOs are in Haiti to stay and there has to be a way to 
make them work well in the context of Haiti.  
CORRECTING TRADITIONAL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION METHODS 
The Miseducation of Donors 
By revisiting the roles donor play in the selection and implementation of projects, 
we gain a better understanding of the traditional methods NGOs have used in order to 
find approaches that can be improved. The restrictions imposed on field staff by donors 
has created a sometimes clinical and one-size-fits-all approach to solving hyper specific 
problems that require targeted solutions. In an industry where change is hard to quantify, 
agencies rely heavily on metrics that usually cannot accurately illustrate the state of the 
communities being served in order to secure continued or increased funding for their 
projects (Schoneberg, 2016). Deep and meaningful change takes time and sometimes 
cannot be seen within limited periods of time, but the pressure from donors to create 
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“quick impact” leads to a focus on projects with short-term and sometimes superficial 
impact (Schoneberg, 2016). Pearce summarized this pressure to please donors perfectly 
when he wrote, “the demands of back-donors often compete with what remains a sincere 
commitment to global change” (2010: 630). 
Figure 2: Humanitarian Haiti Cholera Training. Source:  World Concern 
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In order to do away with the mentality of putting donors first within the NGO 
community, upper level staff members must advocate on behalf of the communities they 
work in. Aid work cannot be streamlined or robotic like a production line. Field staff 
needs flexibility, including permission to stray from the original project, the mission, and 
in some cases even the community where they serve. Such flexibility allows agencies to 
properly serve their beneficiaries, creating meaningful, long term impact that continues 
decades after the agency has moved on. On the other hand, such flexibility is misused if 
agencies jump from aid fad to aid fad to keep donors happy (Pearce, 2010); for example, 
to secure additional funding, an agency that has strong connections and capabilities in the 
clean water area may switch to health services even without the necessary expertise.  
Accountability 
While donors may remain faceless, the brand of the agency and the faces of staff 
members are closely tied to the work being done in communities. Community members 
remember what agency worked in their community and the change (or lack of change) 
that the agency created, but NGOs are nevertheless in a position to leave a trail of failed 
projects without having to answer to any authorities. While NGOs provide over 70% of 
Haiti’s social services and have actively stripped the government through predatory 
hiring practices and conscious exclusion of much of its authority, community members 
and nations all around the world blame the Haitian government for the lack of 
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development in Haiti (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015). In the words of Pierre-Louis 
(2011); “Although the government is unaware of the activities of most NGOs in the 
country, it is nevertheless held accountable by the population when a hurricane or other 
disaster occurs. Often, the NGOs that are funded to intervene disappear or change their 
activities. In 2008, after the three hurricanes that destroyed the city of Gonaives in the 
Artibonite region, the population blamed the government for its ineptitude and the work 
that the NGOs were doing in the city, which contributed to the destruction” (Pierre-Louis, 
2011:198 ). 
Community First 
The first step to limiting the power of foreign aid agencies, as proposed by 
Edmond (2012), is to “work with the Haitian people, listen to their demands and give 
them control over the reconstruction of their own country” (2012: 450). While it is 
necessary to reduce the influence of foreign aid agencies on local governance, it is also 
important to follow the recommendation of academics and local aid officials throughout 
the industry to let “the Haitian population itself take charge of its own development” 
(Schoneberg, 2016: 606). Some methods of nurturing participation and ultimately a sense 
of ownership in projects in a community are: 1) cease the development of projects that 
act as a band aid instead of resolving deeper issues; 2) hire local staff members in key 
positions instead of outsourcing positions of influence and power to foreigners; and 3) 
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involve community members throughout the entire project, not only in specific stages 
created for community ‘buy in’ (Edmonds, 2012; Pearce, 2010; Panda, 2007).  
NOW HAITIANS ‘OWN’ THE SITUATION: CAPACITY BUILDING 
As reflected upon earlier, it is very difficult to expedite change. With a mountain 
of work ahead of them, NGO staff members should come into communities with a spirit 
of change. While it is easy to report how many wells have been installed or how many 
children have been taught, the “vicious circle” of aid has led development scholars to 
emphasize the importance of capacity building (Buss, 2015). Capacity building gives 
communities the opportunity to support themselves long after donors have moved on to 
the next fad or disaster. However, research shows that projects often act as costly band 
aids instead of addressing underlying societal problems (Schoneberg, 2016; Buss, 2015). 
INGOs in Haiti have created an environment where community members are dedicated to 
accessing the services and resources provided by aid organizations, instead of questioning 
why those same services are scarce or how to change the systems that are making those 
services and resources scarce in the first place (Edmond, 2012). Edmond echoes an older 
hypothesis by James Petras in 1997, that NGOs may be employing a tactic that creates a 
sense of “empowerment” that never exceeds “certain conditions permitted by the 
neoliberal state and macro-economy” (2012: 444).  
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Before stepping foot onto Haitian soil, agencies already have a project they are 
looking to implement, but due to bad press after the 2010 earthquake agencies are now 
careful about seeking out community input on projects. Schuller recalls a local aid worker 
begging an agency to shift their priorities to something the community terribly needs and 
is ​asking ​for (2009). Interactions such as these have created a “rebirth” of grassroots 
efforts from Haitian-led organizations, “organisation populaires” (Edmond, 2012). These 
organizations are working to activate communities to fight for what is important to them, 
advocating for officials to be held accountable, and delivering useful and necessary 
services. Organizations such as Partners in Health, for example, are training doctors and 
nurses and providing basic health services, all in the  hope that the organization itself 
eventually will become obsolete (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015; Zanotti, 2010).  
In addition to failing to listen to the communities they work in, organizations are 
failing to incorporate proper capacity building strategies in the communities where they 
work.  In addition, capacity building in Haiti should also extend beyond community 
members to local and national government.  Large organizations such as the Red Cross 
and the United Nations should work towards preparing the Haitian government to 
providing for its citizens again. After decades of watching other powers provide most of 
the nation’s budget and services, national government officials have seen their capacities 
to govern reduced. For example, in 1999, USAID contracted a US-based consulting firm 
to “sidestep” the Haitian government and provide basic health services, illustrating how 
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the distrust of the Haitian government that donor nations have held since the Papa Doc 
dictatorship is crippling the Haitian government further. Ultimately, NGOs cannot 
replace the state and Haitians want to return power to their government. In the end, the 




DISASTERS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS IN HAITI 
Before debating the need for NGOs in Haiti, it is important to understand Haiti’s 
political and economic history. One of the most common phrases I heard when speaking 
to members of different organizations was the importance of “working where there is 
need.” By gaining a basic, surface level of understanding of Haiti’s economic state, we 
can better understand how it was so easily transformed into the “Republic of NGOs”. 
Since its founding as an independent nation, the western half of the island of 
Hispaniola has dealt with constant natural disasters, shifts in leadership, interventions by 
global powers, and an influx of NGOs. It has long been thought that Haiti has faced a 
unique set of circumstances that have caused it to develop slower than other nations. At a 
fifth the size of the state of Florida, the small country has faced multiple foreign 
interventions, decades of political instability, and some of the worst natural disasters in 
the western hemisphere. In this chapter, I will revisit the history of foreign intervention in 
Haiti. I will examine the events that followed the Haitian revolution and the lead-up to 
the notorious 2010 earthquake, the rise of NGOs after the earthquake, and their effect on 
the citizens of Haiti.  
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In its infancy as a nation, Haiti struggled to stand alone after gaining 
independence from France. After winning freedom, Haiti was unable to trade with many 
of its neighbors. Authorities in other nations with colonies in the Americas feared that the 
successful Haitian revolution would inspire slaves in other places to also seek freedom. 
For over a decade after gaining freedom, Haiti was unable to trade with most nations due 
to pressure placed on other nations from France, Haiti’s previous colonizer. Seeking 
better opportunities for trading from neighboring nations, Haiti agreed to pay 120 francs 
-later reduced to 90- in restitution to France for their loss due to Haiti becoming a free 
republic (Henochsberg, 2016). Some have argued that the decade of forced isolation 
leading into a century of paying a hefty debt undermined Haiti’s development 
(Henochsberg, 2016; Edmonds, 2012; Schuller, 2007).  
Following in the footsteps of France, the United States finally recognized Haiti as 
a self-ruling republic in 1862, 58 years after it became a free nation and over 40 years 
after it began paying restitution to France. From 1915 to 1934 the United States occupied 
Haiti in an effort to “restore political stability” (Labrador, 2018). During this time the 
U.S. government controlled many facets of the Haitian government, including national 
security and finance. During the U.S. occupation of Haiti, the United States government 
imposed racial segregation, forced labor, and press censorship, and deposed presidents 
and legislators who opposed the U.S. presence (Labrador, 2018). In an article penned for 
the New Yorker, Danticat (2015) remembers the stories shared by his family members 
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about the constant pressure that having foreign military in their neighborhoods placed on 
their lives. One scar still left from the U.S. occupation of Haiti was the loss of land and of 
citizens after the redrawing of the Hispaniola border. Danticat remembers how the day 
after the US moved the border in 1929, many Haitians woke up newly 
Haitian-Dominican. Decisions made by both France, United States and other jarring 
events in Haiti’s past have thus led to the country we see before us today. 
Faced with a low GDP and a lack of natural resources, Haiti has suffered an 
unequal and even subservient relationship with other countries throughout the years. A 
quick overview of the uneven relationships with major donor nations and countries in the 
region helps us better understand how Haiti has not developed as fast as other nations 
similar in age: 
-  The dependent and often tense relationship between Haiti and the United States is 
unstable, changing with every new administration (Haitian or American).  
- Until 2010, no French President had ever visited Haiti. 
- In 1937, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo carried out the Parsley Massacre, 
killing Haitians and Dominicans who were “dark enough” to be seen as Haitian 
(Phillip, 2015). In 2015, the Dominican government began patrolling 
neighborhoods with large migrant populations in an effort to find and deport 
people of Haitian descent.  
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- During the Duvalier regime from the later 50s to late 80, many Haitians fled to the 
French speaking province of Quebec, Canada. At the same time, Haiti is also one 
of Quebec's largest recipients of aid and a large number of Canadian 
organizations are working in Haiti. This relationship illustrates both the brain 
drain and dependence on other nations that have traditionally hindered Haiti’s 
ability to develop independently.  
Even though the Haitian government was not stable before the US occupation, the 
heavily armed presence of the United States coupled with the never ending debt to France 
also did not contribute to making Haiti a stronger nation. ​I​nstead, Haiti became dependent 
on the United States as its largest trading partner, and the United States became home to 
the largest diaspora of Haitians. Haiti’s dependency on the United States is thus 
emblematic of the country’s relationship with other nations in North America, the 
Caribbean, and South America as primarily a recipient of foreign aid and a sender of 
large numbers of migrants. While the relationship with France and the United States has 
always been strained, the foreign aid donated by these nations are some of the largest. 
Not always a topic of discussion, Haiti also has strong relationships with the Republic of 
China and Germany. Due to its location near the United States and the Panama Canal, 
Haiti is seen as a strategic country.  
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As mentioned earlier, after becoming the first free black republic Haiti spent over 
a century paying France the modern equivalent of $21 billion in reparations to former 
slave owners for the loss of their slaves. Sixty years later the “poorest nation in the 
western hemisphere” is still desperately trying to recover from such a large monetary 
loss.  
According to the World Bank, Haiti’s gross national income has been steadily 
rising since 2004 before a predictable downturn following the 2010 earthquake (World 
Bank, 2018). While the island is prone to natural disasters, two-fifth of its citizens are 
dependent on the agriculture sector which is particularly vulnerable to disasters (Central 
Intelligence Agency, n.d.). Last year, an estimated 30% of the nation’s nearly $9 billion 
annual GDP came from remittances (World Bank, 2018). While Haiti during the colonial 
era made France so incredibly wealthy that it became known as “The French Crown 
Jewel”, today Haiti imports about three times more than it exports, leaving its economy 
heavily reliant on its major trade partner, the United States.  
The political instability in Haiti has contributed to foster an environment that is 
not conducive to international partnerships. Since it first became a republic, Haiti has had 
over 40 presidents. The majority of these presidents were either forced out of their 
position due to coups or killed. For almost thirty years during the late 20​th​ century, other 
countries avoided Haiti as the brutal Duvalier regime sent the country into social chaos. 
Between the constant threat of political or military action from other nations, the lack of 
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cooperation with a nation made of ex-slaves, and debt to one country or another that 
looms over the head of every Haitian citizen, it is easy to see how Haiti fell into such 
disarray. It is also easy to see how it was the perfect landing ground for thousands of 
NGOs.  
Long before the 2010 earthquake, Haiti had already become host to a large NGO 
sector. Kevin Edmond of NACLA reminds us that even before the earthquake Haiti had 
an estimated 10,000 NGOs working within its borders, and today, 80% of Haiti’s basic 
services are provided through NGOs (Edmond, 2010). It is difficult to pinpoint the exact 
time that Haiti transformed into this “Republic of NGOs”, but one event that allowed 
Haiti to become home to so many NGOs occurred in 1954 when Hurricane Hazel ravaged 
the island for three long days (Schwartz, 2015). Once the dust settled, Care International 
came to Haiti to aid in the relief efforts. According to Schwartz, when the charities saw 
the widespread illiteracy and inefficient public health in Haiti, the American and 
European nations began to donate more to helping Haiti. By 1970, Haiti’s aid had 
exploded to the point that it was already the “most aided country in the western 
hemisphere” (Schwartz, 2015). By 1986, Haiti had fully transformed into the “Republic 
of NGOs.” NGOs had already assumed responsibility for the provision of healthcare, 
water, and education, and had started running food and agriculture agencies. NGOs had 
become so powerful and necessary for the day-to-day life of Haitians across the country 
that in 2001, the Haitian government was crippled when aid agencies imposed an “aid 
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embargo”. Without the resources being supplied by NGOs, the country struggled to make 
ends meet. Haiti had become desperately reliant on international aid in order to conduct 
any business, and this reliance was soon to be painfully obvious following the 2010 
earthquake.  
On January 12th, 2010 at 4:53 pm Haiti was hit by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake. 
According to news reports at the time, 200,000 people died and millions were displaced 
(CNN, 2017). The cost to repair the damages was estimated at $7.8 billion, an amount 
greater than Haiti’s entire GDP the year prior (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015). The 
earthquake not only destroyed or damaged 80 percent of rural housing, but it also 
destroyed countless public buildings, schools, medical facilities and government offices 
(Cook, 2015) . To this day Haiti is still trying to recover its infrastructure, its finances, 
and its society from the devastating earthquake, even while the country continues to be 
impacted almost yearly by other natural disasters.  
According to the United Nations Office of Special Envoy for Haiti, $13.34 Billion 
aid was pledged by international agencies between 2010 and 2020 (CNN, 2017). There 
have been many reports and articles written about the mismanagement of the donation by 
foreign aid agencies. Earlier this year, Rachel Estabrook of Colorado’s Public Radio 
station acknowledged that despite the great amounts of money donated to Haiti from 
private citizens, companies, and countries, many people in Haiti were still living in 
temporary housing and struggling to get clean water.  
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One reason behind the slow recovery despite the large infusion of foreign aid is 
the methods used by many NGOs as they develop their projects. Since the Haitian 
government is unstable and government officials have been known to pocket aid money, 
aid agencies such as USAID or the Red Cross assume control of every aspect of a project 
in order to prevent corruption. After the earthquake it was common practice for foreign 
aid organizations to employ foreign contractors instead of local workers to lead projects. 
In an NPR article from 2015, Jake Johnston of the Washington-based Center for 
Economic Policy and Research explains that it costs USAID $33,000 to build one home 
using foreign contractors (Johnston, 2015). In comparison, the non-profit Mission of 
Hope spends five times less by employing local contractors. Another possible reason for 
the slow recovery can be attributed to large foreign aid agencies deciding autonomously 
the scope of their activity in the country, instead of carefully considering the actual needs 
of Haiti (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015). After the earthquake, the U.S. and other donors 
allocated funds and focused on projects that directly went against the wishes of the 
Haitian government. The method of mishandling aid, not hiring locals, flooding the 
country with foreign workers and not prioritizing projects requested by the government 
has cultivated an unfavorable relationship between residents of the country and NGOs 
(Ramachandran & Walz, 2015).  In a CBS story on the relationship between post disaster 
Haiti and INGOs, Caribbean correspondent for the Miami Herald, Jacqueline Charles 
voices her experience with INGOs in Haiti; “oftentimes, these NGOs come into the 
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country, they don’t talk to the people on the ground, they don’t ask them what their needs 
are, and they come in with certain assumptions. They carry this out, and then they run up 
against all of these variable obstacles. And then they just throw their hands up in the air 
and say, ‘You know what? We tried.’” (CBS News, 2015). 
In the years following the earthquake, Haiti also had to attempt to recover from 
many other natural disasters, leading many NGOs to focus their work on emergency 
relief rather than institution- and capacity-building. In 2012, Hurricane Sandy caused 
many deaths and cases of disease. The hurricane was followed by a three-year drought 
that left many starving and unable to work. In 2016, Hurricane Matthew killed 
approximately 1,000 people while destroying many homes and adding more cases of 
disease, such as cholera, to the island.  
The level of capability and accountability of NGOs in Haiti have been discussed 
for decades. In 2010, the media shed light on the practice of mismanagement of aid 
money. It was not until then that politicians, scholars, and others in and outside of Haiti 
began to openly question the traditional practices of such agencies. Today the role and 
work of aid agencies in Haiti have been opened up to questioning and discussion. In his 
article ​Beyond Good Intentions: The Structural Limitations of NGOs in Haiti ​, Kevin 
Edmond challenges the broad stroke of savior with which NGOs in Haiti had been 
painted for so long (Edmond, 2012). What began as a humanitarian effort to help those 
injured and left homeless after a natural disaster soon evolved into a quasi-governmental 
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apparatus. During Aristide’s second administration, an economic embargo was placed on 
the nation. The embargo left the government unable to pay public employees and teachers 
or to purchase necessary supplies for local hospitals.  
Seeing the gaps in the government's ability to look after the Haitian people, NGOs 
begin offering these services to communities. This left the Haitian community not only 
dependent on NGOs for basic needs, but also planted a seed of doubt that the Haitian 
government would be able to provide services as efficiently as foreign aid agencies. 
Because of this, today over 70% of Haiti’s social services--education, agriculture, 
health-care—are provided by foreign aid agencies. As the largest provider of social 
welfare to the residents of Haiti, the NGO sector has grown quite powerful and 
independent from the Haitian government, which in turn limits the opportunity for 
Haitian government officials to push forward any of their own development initiatives.  
For over two hundred years Haiti has unsuccessfully tried to rule itself. It is 
incredibly difficult for the Haitian government to develop best practices and a sense of 
normalcy when there has always been another power working as a separate government 
within the nation. On the one hand, the Haitian government has had difficulty preventing 
corruption within its ranks; on the other hand, in the words of Ricardo Seitenfus, formerly 
the Organization of American States Special Representative to Haiti, “...there cannot be a 
permanent policy of substituting the NGOs for the state” for the nation to stand on its 
own two feet (Peixoto, 2010). 
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Now that we have begun to recognize the power that foreign aid has over Haiti, 
and the ways in which this situation limits the country’s ability to remain autonomous, 
we can reflect on how this colors the way that local residents interact with the work done 
by NGOs. A Haitian senior staff member from UN-Habitat Haiti revealed that many 
community members believe that NGOs are not actually doing anything. When asked 
about barriers to working with residents due to current attitudes towards NGOs, the staff 
member responded, “They have not seen peace. So when you tell them the cavalry is 
coming they say, well, I’m timid. They only thing I see is cars, you know, going in and 
out, and I'm very skeptical. Not to say, another thing they want to say: You guys are just, 
whatever you're doing, you're kind of using the money but not building anything for me. 
It's not justified. I have to say perception matters”.  
After many reports of misuse of aid funds after 2010, many NGOs have begun 
taking a more community engagement approach towards working in the country. 
Unfortunately, the memories of past faux pas have caused locals to be more skeptical 
about the help they are offered. A senior staff member at another NGO reflected on how 
traditionally NGOs would come to communities with plans and begin projects without 
even attempting to open a dialogue with the locals or the government. Such lack of 
community engagement has led to failed projects throughout the country, which in turn 
prompts justified cynicism towards new initiatives on the part of residents.  
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Figure 3: UN-Habitat Executive Director Walks Recently Built Footpath in 
Port-au-Prince, Haiti (2013). Source: UN Habitat  
After so many years of being subject to the whims of foreign aid agencies, a 
picture about how NGOs traditionally thought of locals became clear. In our interview, 
the staff member from Anseye Pou Ayiti shared her feelings on how local residents had 
routinely been treated in the past: “Myself and my team believe that solutions already 
exists within the community but they have been told over generations that they’re not 
good enough or that they are ‘poor’ or that they are ‘underdeveloped’”. A staff member 
from World Neighbors shared similar experiences from the communities where she 
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works, saying that “... the government does not take them seriously when they are asking 
for help. Sometimes they come back to [us] for help”. Though the old top-down 
development practice that created this atmosphere of abandonment and worthlessness in 
the Haitian community has been phased out for years now, the sensitivity around NGOs 
remains within many communities throughout the country. In the following chapter, I 
will describe the current methods used by NGOs (foreign and local; large and small), to 
cultivate an environment of engagement and a sense of possibility within the 
communities where they work. Such methods may prove key to helping Haiti progress 
and release its dependency in a way that it has not been able to in decades.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES IN HAITI AND THEIR PRACTICES 
AGENCIES INTERVIEWED 
Co-founded by Negine Paul Deroly and T. Morgan Dixon, Anseye Pou Ayiti - or 
Teach For Haiti in English- is a relatively young movement​ ​that offers local Haitian civic 
leaders the opportunity to advance educational equity in their community (Anseye Pou 
Ayiti). Working primarily in underserved and rural communities, Anseye Pou Aytiti 
(APA) has been able to partner with over 46 schools since its inception in 2009 (Anseye 
Pou Ayiti, 2017). Grassroots in its model and practice, APA creates change by “modeling 
civic leadership, rooting itself in Haitian culture, maintaining a network of alumni, 
partnering to ensure maximum impact, and continuous monitoring and evaluation (APA). 
Speaking to the co-founder and CEO, Deroly, I was able to get a better understanding of 
how APA empowers communities to work towards equitable education.  
As one of the older organizations interviewed, World Concern’s Senior Desk 
Officer, Susan Talbot, brought over 60 years of company experience to the conversation. 
After working for 20 years in several developing nations, World Concern shifted its 
model away from “handouts” towards working alongside communities to develop 
long-term solutions. According to the organization's website, “today, [their] emphasis is 
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on holistic community development as [they] equip villages to determine and implement 
their own development projects. By allowing families and communities to express their 
own needs and use existing resources to address these needs, the transformation will last 
into future generations” (World Concern). 
Described by local Haitian staff as an international organization with grassroots 
methods, World Neighbor works in two ​arrondissements​ (districts) of the Department of 
Artibonite in Haiti. With a limited staff, the agency focuses on a wide variety of issues 
within the community: saving and credit groups, agriculture, disaster preparedness and 
more. Similar to the World Concern, World Neighbors views its approach as a way to 
reduce “dependence on external aid” and support “self-reliance” (World Neighbors). 
According to the agency’s website, “World Neighbors focuses on training and educating 
communities to find lasting solutions to the challenges they face – hunger, poverty, and 
disease – rather than giving them food, money or constructing buildings” (World 
Neighbors). 
As a fairly young initiative, UN-Habitat has become a well-known actor in the 
disaster relief community. Unlike the other organizations interviewed, UN-Habitat has 
practiced a more macro approach when working in developing nations. UN-Habitat - as a 
collective, not only the Haiti team- works by setting urban development goals that are 
achieved through cooperation with the major public, private, or hybrid actors. According 
to the UN Habitat website, these players are referred to as “c​ommitted partners, relevant 
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stakeholders, and urban actors, including at all levels of government as well as the private 
sector” (​UN Habitat​).  
ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS OF AGE ​​N ​​CIES 
When working within a complex social and urban landscape, relationships are 
crucial to the impact and longevity of a project. There have been many ways of referring 
to the act of creating or curating relationship to drive a development project: community 
buy-in, neighborhood investment, and community engagement are the modern buzzwords 
being used within the international aid, relief, and development arena. The roles that the 
different organizations played and the forms of relationships they pursued were wide in 
scope and varied. Looking at the range and intensity of each organization helps us better 
understand the mission, goals, and potential long-term impact and sustainability of every 
unique project.  
In terms of the agencies’ relationship with the Haitian government, UN-Habitat 
was the only actor that was in regular and substantive communication with any state 
agency, perhaps due to its standing as a government-funded agency. While most 
representatives of the other organizations maintained they worked ​in spite ​of the 
government, my interviewee at UN-Habitat affirmed that the agency worked in 
agreement with the government. However, even though all of the other organizations 
asserted that they did not have strong ties to any state agency, many of them expressed 
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interest in one day working in tandem with state officials. Deroly, co-founder of Anseye 
Pou Ayiti (APA) and representatives of the World Neighbors team all expressed a hope 
that the communities and work they are doing will be acknowledged and supported by the 
government in the future. Since 2010, the Haitian federal government has made great 
strides towards developing relationships with NGOs. However, it is still unclear what role 
the government wants to play in working with NGOs, and if this renewed interest in 
collaborating with NGOs will trickle down to the smaller organizations such as APA and 
World Neighbors.  
In addition to their relationship with the national government, it is important to 
assess the working relationships individual agencies have with each other. Until recently, 
it could be argued that Haiti was the Wild West of NGOs, especially shortly after the 
2010 earthquake. Without an accurate census of how many organizations were in the 
country and exactly what projects they were working on, many began to question their 
influence or direction—especially since agencies often seemed to be working with little 
coordination. When asked about the issue of inter-agency collaboration, the 
representatives of the organizations gave vastly different views on cooperating with the 
NGO next door. In order to establish its own projects, many organizations intentionally 
seek hard-to-reach communities or communities that do not already have an NGO 
present. When asked about the relationship World Concern has with other NGOs, Talbot 
responded: “We tend to try to find those areas where other agencies aren't working. 
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Because we don't want to be working on top of other agencies.” Later he added, however, 
that “we also think it is important to collaborate with other NGOs because we don't want 
to leave gaps or work on top of them”. Typically, to “collaborate” suggests working 
together or a partnership towards a collective goal, but from the perspective of World 
Concern collaborating refers to coordinating efforts to avoid overlapping in the field.  
Unlike the others, the UN-Habitat found great value in partnering with other 
NGOs. When detailing the work being done, ​Louis Jadotte​, director of the UN-Habitat 
unit in Haiti, described the roles that every partner played. According to Jadotte, in order 
to bring projects to fruition, the Red Cross worked extensively on the social dynamics of 
the community while USAID was dubbed as UN-Habitat’s “implementation partner:” 
That unit delegated the Red Cross and said okay since you are going to be on the                 
ground you coordinate the social organizations' activities. Red Cross, said          
to all the coalition partners, to please intervene using the same the            
channels so that there is less confusion to the beneficiaries and also there             
is right messaging to the beneficiaries. So that the beneficiaries understand           
that all the partners coming to the ground that there is a concerted effort,              
an integrated effort to solve the problems that they are facing so that they              
orient themselves (​Jadotte: 2018)​. 
In this specific case, large international foreign aid groups made a conscious 
effort to work together. While critics may argue that such a focus on partnership may be 
motivated by the need for positive publicity--in the past major NGOs had been chastised 
for being wasteful--the benefits to the practice of working together cannot be denied, 
fiscally or socially. 
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Finally, the relationship established between agencies and communities and 
community members is critical for the effectiveness of aid relief and the sustainability of 
projects. Every representative interviewed praised the practice of working in partnership 
with communities. The interviewee from Anseye Pou Ayiti reflected on how the 
organization nurtured relationships with stakeholders in all the communities where they 
worked. UN-Habitat recognized the importance of respecting the community members’ 
lived experiences before beginning a project. And the representative of World Neighbors 
spent a lot of the conversation discussing the need to understand the community and 
engage with locals long before a project is introduced. Following suit, the official at 
World Concern also expressed the need to “walk alongside” communities. However, 
although all the agencies were strong advocates of relationship building, they all pursued 
slightly different approaches to gain community trust. One noticeable improvement in the 
majority of the agencies was their staffing. Many of the organizations spoken to were 
Haitian led; a socially impactful improvement that will be unpacked further in the 
upcoming section. 
METHODS AND APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP 
With scandals plaguing NGOs in the past years, the idea of trust has become a 
pri​n​cipal co​n​cer​n​ for NGOs, the nations they work for and in, and the community 
members that they seek to serve. Possibly due to the scrutiny from stakeholders, many 
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agencies have shifted their conventional methods in an effort to place more value and 
effort on building relationships with members of the communities that they work in. 
Using insights received during the interview process, we will be able to gain a better 
understanding of some of the relationship building strategies being pursued by the four 
agencies.  
“Listening” was a key ingredient in nurturing a connection with community 
members. World Neighbors, Anseye Pou Ayiti, and UN-Habitat all acknowledged the 
power in simply listening to locals on key issues. When asked about where their 
confidence as a movement come from, Deroly of Anseye Pou Ayiti remarked, “We 
wanted to make sure that we went into communities where we listened. Literally. 
Listened to be able to hear what they felt would be the best solutions and best 
investments.” Beginning their projects with a listening tour has helped Anseye Pou Ayiti 
provide targeted services to each unique community and create an environment of 
empowerment for all of those affected the program. Deroly agrees that listening can be 
the best tool available to NGOs; noting, “We understand that there are local assets and 
local solutions that have just not been given the platform or the amplification that they 
deserve. That's why listening, honestly, is what we believe to be leadership.” Listening to 
the experiences and opinions of communities not only reflects due diligence and 
necessary research on the part of the NGO, but it is also key to beginning to lay down the 
foundation for the years-long relationship that should be taking place.  
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Echoing the same sentiment as Deroly, the director of UN- Habitat Haiti 
understands the effort that must go into forging a working relationship with a community 
before developi ​n​g a​n​y plans for a project. At the beginning of our interview, the director 
outlined the roles that every partner played in executing a plan. While UN-Habitat- Haiti 
was the key implementation partner, Red Cross built the social capacity for the project. 
“When the Red Cross comes and starts researching neighborhoods, [they ask themselves] 
… Who is going to tell us that we are doing is right or wrong? ... Who is going to be our 
partner?” This line of questioning from the director is i ​n​formed by a co ​n​cer ​n​ about 
developi​n​g trust, a​n​d such trust will help e ​n​sure the project is successful a ​n​d that 
community members will be honest i ​n​ their opinion a ​n​d ope​n​ about the needs of the 
community.  
After both the agency and the communities feel that there has been ample 
listening and opportunities for trust building, projects enter their next phase: developi ​n​g 
the structure of the community partnership. After the mismanagement of the 2010 Haitian 
Earthquake, it had become evident that the missions of NGOs were not aligning with 
their roles. A common pattern of action for NGOs before 2010 was to follow the 
top-down methods of project implementation. While there were a lot of NGOs partnering 
with members of the community and engaging in participatory methods of development, 
large charitable NGOs such as the American Red Cross established themselves as 
parental or umbrella organizations. These top-down organizations created an environment 
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where communities were only beneficiaries and not partners, leadi​n​g to both rese​n​tme​n​t 
a​n​d passivity o​n​ the part of commu​n​ity members. Community members felt powerless to 
create projects on their own terms.  
 In response to a questio​n​ about barriers they face whe​n​ working with a 
community, the represe​n​tative of World Concern revealed the reason why they choose to 
work apart from other NGOs: “We have also found it difficult to work in areas other 
NGOs had come in and just done distribution and left. Because then that is the 
expectation. You have created a dependency mentality.” It ca​n​ be argued whether a 
dependency mentality has bee​n​ created, or communities have been conditioned by the aid 
structure to play the role of clie​n​t. I​n​ either case, agencies have ​n​ow begun shifting their 
methods in order to create a more equitable relatio​n​ship with commu​n​ities. As a 
suggestio​n​ for other agencies, the staff member at World Concern asserts, “when you go 
into a community with the mentality that you are there to partner with them, and to help 
them to own their own development, and you show them ways that they have the power 
to change and can influence and make things better for themselves. It's dignifying”. 
Within the context of Haiti, partnering with communities does not only mean 
having a strong relationship with the members of the community, but also bringing the 
community together under one voice. According to Angeline Tirogene, country 
representative for World Neighbors, “NGOs in Haiti cannot work with people alone so 
now the people must form organizations so that NGOs can work with them”. In some 
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instances, this approach can protect communities from NGOs who end up doing more 
harm than intended, si​n​ce commu​n​ities will have a stro​n​ger voice i​n​ their e​n​gageme​n​t 
with the age​n​cy.  O​n​ the other ha​n​d, due to the financial burden of obtai​n​i​n​g status as a 
Community Based Organization (CBO), communities with limited means a​n​d weak 
orga​n​izatio​n​al capacity may be unable to partner with agencies on projects. For those 
communities who are able to develop a formal organization, their power and ability to 
have their voice heard has grown exponentially. Working with CBOs forces 
accountability o​n​ all parties, u​n​like i​n​ the past whe​n​ projects may have received little 
oversight. From the perspective of UN-Habitat, such community organizations--similar to 
neighborhood associations in the United States--are referred to as ​Tables de Cartier 
(TDC), or “neighborhood tables”. Such TDCs are created by the Red Cross in the district 
of Canaan outside of the capital city of Port Au Prince to help agencies better execute 
projects. As Jadotte with UN Habitat said, such TDCs are grassroots orga​n​izatio​n​s 
esse ​n​tial for sustai​n​ability of projects: 
TDC is a grassroots organization created [by the American Red Cross]. It is not              
pure grassroots on their own, it is more of social engineering of [the]             
grassroots organization. When somebody comes, when the Red Cross         
comes and starts researching neighborhoods. What are we going to map           
for? Who is going to tell us that we are doing is right or wrong? What we                 
can do, what we can’t do? Who is going to be our partner when we have to                 
question people who are already there? Everyone wants projects. Who is           
the partner? (​Jadotte​: 2018). 
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Based o​n​ UN-Habitat Haiti’s account, it is appare​n​t that aid agencies and the Haitian 
government both agree that a stable, trustworthy, a​n​d organized collective of voices is 
necessary when tackling projects that will affect community members.  
Accordi​n​g to Anseye Pou Aytiti, listening allows the age​n​cy to ide​n​tify “best 
solutions and best investments”. Many agencies believe that self-realized solutions are an 
NGO’s best opportunity to produce long lasting and impactful projects. Similar to 
Anseye Pou Ayiti, World Concern encourages self-realized solutions. I​n​ the words of 
Talbot, “we believe in empowering communities to identify their difficulties and they 
come up with their own solutions”. While there have been thousands of NGOs working 
in Haiti in the past decades, there has not been a shift towards the better for the country. 
One cause of this could be the lack of local knowledge and local partnering going into 
NGO funded projects. ​Talbot with​ World Concern said it best: “it is important for us to 
walk alongside, not top to bottom, in identifying and solving problems”;  
However, self-realized solutions are only as good as the implementation of them. 
When discussing relationship-building and project impact, it is very important that 
communities have their voices heard—but also ​see​ that their voices are being heard. 
Accordi​n​g to i​n​terviewees, local reside​n​ts must see themselves in projects being 
developed in their neighborhoods. However, the i​n​terviewees all pursued different 
methods of incorporating local ideas and local participation. World Neighbors has a 
practice of never staying in a community for longer than seven years. This strategy places 
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the burden of responsibility for the outcome of the project on the community. As 
i​n​dicated by the director, “that means they need to use themselves to develop themselves. 
We work with them to let themselves go”.  In other words, World Neighbors has created 
a model of mentoring communities to not only take part in projects but to take lead and 
maintain projects once the agency leaves the neighborhood.  
World Concern and Anseye Pou Ayiti take a similar approach of allowing the 
reside​n​ts to carry the responsibility for the progress of their own community.  In the case 
of Anseye Pou Ayiti, they recruit teachers from within the communities they are working 
with. Accordi​n​g to Deroly, “we have to recruit from the community that we said we want 
to partner with. Those who've experienced the inequity are the ones who should be 
leaving the movement to end it.” It is important that community members understand that 
the NGO is working ​for ​ the community. That mea ​n​s that the way the age ​n​cy i​n​teracts 
with reside​n​ts is the most important measure of the success of a project.  
As a larger entity fou ​n​ded by ​n​atio ​n​al gover ​n​me​n​ts instead of private donors, 
UN-Habitat incorporates the community in a more clinical and top-dow ​n​ way. When 
describing the role the community plays in the creation of the project, the director 
explained: “The first is making them understand those maps. Secondly, understanding 
some criteria to develop improvements. And then have them come up with their proposal. 
Then we treat them a bit. So that they can still recognize that it is theirs. And then we 
have them appropriate it so that it becomes theirs”. Unlike the other organizations where 
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the projects begin based o​n​ community i​n​terest and are implemented and maintained by 
the community, UN-Habitat limits commu​n​ity e​n​gageme​n​t to certai​n​ moments: mome​n​ts 
whe​n​ the community members are allowed to share their thoughts, moments where the 
community shares ideas and, finally moments where the community shares responsibility. 
While the UN Habitat’s size and position as a inter-governmental agency makes it more 
challe​n​gi​n​g to pursue the sort of grassroots approach taken by smaller NGOs, their 
method of “scheduled community input” may have a negative impact o​n​ the longevity 
and results of their projects.  
In the same vein as incorporating ideas for projects, it is the responsibility of an 
agency to incorporate community concerns and interests. Community forums have 
become a very popular source of decision making for organizations in Haiti. CBOs are 
run in a very similar way as city council or neighborhood association meetings. The 
community group has a leader but community members are invited to listen or speak. 
Decisio​n​s affecting the neighborhood are discussed; this decision usually revolves around 
an NGO project. Many of these groups, organizations, or committees are created for the 
sole purpose of working with NGOs. As mentioned earlier by the director of World 
Neighbors, NGOs cannot work with individual people, only with recognized CBOs. 
Many CBOs have been created by NGOs due to the cost associated with being 
recognized as a CBO by the government.  During our discussion, the staff member of 
World Concern described how their organization helps communities form 
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“decision-making committees:” “Communities already have a governing structure, so we 
don't go in a set up a government… We have them create community committees. We 
train them to actually become the mobilizers in their communities in hygiene, water 
management, agriculture. We have them form cooperatives so that they have more 
empowerment in the marketplace.”  
All organizations interviewed referenced the governing structures already in place 
within the communities they work in. It would be a huge disservice to both the 
communities being served and the NGOs worki ​n​g with them to not use these structures to 
improve the sustai ​n​ability of projects. Once the project is completed, it is these same 
governing structures that will ensure the project is supported and improved for 
generations to come. As the director of World Neighbors said, emphasizi ​n​g the 
importa​n​ce of stre​n​gthe​n​i​n​g commu ​n​ities’ ability to sustai ​n​ projects o ​n​ce the age ​n​cy 
leaves: “We come to the community, we talk to the people, we help build them and then 
we leave”.  
Ultimately, leaving is one of the most difficult challe ​n​ges for NGOs. Due to 
Haiti’s position in the Caribbean Sea, it is frequently pelted with one natural disaster after 
another, rarely with enough time to recover. Because there will most likely always be 
another natural disaster on its way to Haiti, it is crucial that NGOs leave their 
communities with the capability to aid themselves. By sponsoring programs and projects 
that intentionally nurture an environment that promotes self-realized solutions, 
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established organized committees, and empowers communities to speak on their own 
behalf, NGOs can create more resilient communities.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
A ​​N ​​ALYSIS A ​​N ​​D RECOMME​​N ​​DATIO​​N ​​S 
Through this descriptio​n​ of NGOs and their work in Haiti, some commo​n 
techniques and strategies have become appare​n​t. In this chapter, I discuss some of the 
overarchi​n​g themes emergi​n​g from this research and recommend some opportunities for 
improvement. As an outsider looking in, it is easy to suspect methods and list flaws. 
Furthermore, the distance I have mai​n​tai​n​ed as a researcher preve​n​ts me from 
understanding the ma​n​y intricate considerations that ​n​eed to be take​n​ by directors and 
staff members. O​n​ the other ha​n​d, this same distance has allowed me to exami​n​e the 
situation i​n​ the country and aid industry as a whole. Drawi​n​g o​n​ this perspective, this 
chapter refocuses the conversation from the commo​n​ focus o​n​ financial mismanagement 
of large agencies to the less considered, but equally importa​n​t, failure to e​n​gage with 
community members i​n​ the developme​n​t a​n​d executio​n​ of projects.  
Based o​n​ my review of the common community engagement methods used by 
these agencies i​n​ Haiti, I have ide​n​tified several core opportunities for community 
development, or, rather, community re-education. My findings suggest that NGOs have 
missed  key chances to develop not only the capacities of community members, but also 
that of local agencies and the Haitian ​n​atio​n​al government. This chapter will focus o​n 
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three general themes that have plagued Haiti for decades: the power problem, the 
ownership problem, and the capacity problem. Continuing where Schuller left off in his 
article, “Haiti’s 200-Year Menage-a-Trois” (Schuller, 2007), I will question the motives 
behind some methods, applaud other approaches, and recommend steps for improvi​n​g the 
effective​n​ess of aid provisio​n​ in Haiti. I will begin by questio​n​i​n​g the power that foreign 
agencies hold in Haiti, then argue for the need for more spaces that create genuine 
community participation and ownership, and finally, partnering these two themes to 
guide a much needed conversation on how intentional capacity building can and should 
be incorporated throughout all categories of NGOs i​n​ Haiti. 
THE POWER PROBLEM
Echoing Schoneberg, INGOs carry power simply by existing (2017). It can be 
argued that this power was given to them by local residents; however, when looking at 
the history of foreign intervention in Haiti since the cou​n​try’s inception, INGOs have 
gai​n​ed power comme​n​surate with the amount of money they have fu​nn​eled i​n​to the 
cou​n​try. As long as INGOs co​n​trol the aid money, they will continue to have the power 
to direct developme​n​t projects i​n​ the country. While ma​n​y developme​n​t projects have 
had positive impacts (Schoneberg, 2017), other projects have merely reproduced a 
sig​n​ifica​n​t, long-term problem: lack of ability by local commu​n​ities to recover from 
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major natural disasters, a​n​d lack of capacity amo​n​g local orga​n​izatio​n​s to assist 
commu​n​ities.  
During my research, I discovered that local Haitian-led NGOs have routinely been 
excluded from the funding stream, especially after the 2010 crisis (Ramachandran and 
Walz, 2015). Even though many INGOs claim that they have worked in partnership with 
local partners, it is unclear how these partnerships actually operate (Schoneberg, 2017). 
When one party is financially reliant on the other, the partnership shifts into a form of 
collaboration. While in a partnership both parties have equal opportunity to express 
themselves without risk of retribution, in a collaborative relationship the stronger party 
may dominate and reject compromises with the weaker party. In such a collaboration 
framework, INGOs retain power to select projects and implementation methods. This 
approach may do a disservice to communities, since INGOs are likely to pursue project 
based on the wants of donors instead of the needs of community members. This awkward 
tension is not only observed between foreign and local agencies, but also between foreign 
agencies and the local government.  
As stated earlier, NGOs provide over 70% of basic human services in Haiti. After 
speaking to multiple agencies, it became abundantly clear that the government was a 
secondary if not tertiary actor in the development arena in Haiti. One agency official 
glossed over the role that government played when asked about their relationship with the 
Haitian government, while another agency official suggested that they worked “in spite 
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of” the Haitian government. In fact, according to interviewees, many organizations are 
working in Haiti completely without oversight by the government, and many agencies 
work without considering how their work fits into the vision that the Haitian government 
has for the country. These somewhat shadowy operations have created an environment of 
distrust throughout the nation regarding the true goals of INGOs. Although all of the 
NGO representatives interviewed readily described how they work with community 
members, it was unclear how their work corresponded with that of other agencies or with 
the government. Ultimately, when communities look towards foreign agencies to fill the 
role of their government, deterioration of civil society ensues. At the same time, local 
Haitian-led agencies do not have the power to work alone and the Haitian government 
has become severely weakened.  
THE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PROBLEM 
The agencies I interviewed sought to foster the creation of community based 
organizations (CBO) in order to work with communities. The Haitian government created 
this policy in order to curb unwanted projects and mitigate the mismanagement of funds. 
While CBOs were created as a form of protection and ultimately a source of power for 
communities, these organizations are not necessarily reflective of the interests of 
communities, may be reproducing uneven relations of power within communities, and 
may also be manipulated by external actors. Only after the issue of uneven power 
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relations has been resolved can aid agencies begin to authentically empower community 
members and lead to real community ownership of projects. Such community ownership 
has been identified as key to long-term sustainability of projects and has become the top 
priority among INGOs. However, if community engagement is limited to a presentation 
to the community instead of a dialogue, projects will continue to collapse quickly after 
completion.  
Ownership of a project also means community members should have authority to 
lead the project. In the case of the local agencies I interviewed, they explained that they 
only provided the funding while community members actually implemented and ran the 
projects. Anseye Pou Ayiti and World Neighbors understood that while they have the 
financial resources to propel communities forward, community members had the most 
valuable resource: knowledge of what their community needed and understanding of 
what their community was capable of. Unlike larger agencies, the smaller Haitian-led 
agencies took a more holistic view of all the tools in their possession. In the words of a 
staff member at Anseye Pou Ayiti, solutions already exist within communities. The role 
of the NGO is to bring in techniques and methods that have been tried and tested in order 
to empower these community members to re-cast themselves in a role different from the 
one that they have been traditionally given. In order for true and deep impact to occur in 
these communities, residents have to take ownership in the future of their community. 
Two unknown speakers in Schoneberg’s article, “NGO Partnerships in Haiti,”​ ​said it 
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best: “[You] cannot develop another person. This person can only develop [themselves]” 
through “concerted discussions, concerted analysis of problems, but also the concerted 
search for solutions” (quoted in Schoneberg, 2017). In other words, NGOs will not be the 
ones to ‘save’ Haiti, but through purposeful community engagement and intentional 
dialogue they can be the ones who lead Haiti.  
THE CAPACITY BUILDING PROBLEM 
The true mission of all NGOs in Haiti should be capacity building. Agencies that 
have the opportunity to work with the government should be training officials on how to 
continue to support their communities and how to manage finances, agencies that have 
partnerships with local agencies should be educating them on how to expand and work 
with the government, and agencies that specialize in local empowerment should be 
creating the next leaders and support all methods of advocacy for basic services.  
Beginning at the top, NGOs have surgically excluded the Haitian government 
from participating in the aid sector (Buss, 2015). Crying corruption, foreign nations have 
decided that it would be best if the Haitian government did not take part in the rebuilding 
of their own nation. After the 2010 earthquake, less than 1% of the over $9 billion 
pledged to aid in the reconstruction of Haiti went to the government (Knox, 2015). In a 
country where the government is routinely excluded from development decisions due to 
lack of resources and a history of foreign interference, it should be a priority of major 
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NGOs, especially foreign government funded ones—such as UN-Habitat and the multiple 
divisions of the Red Cross--to begin assisting the government in assuming responsibility 
for disaster mitigation and provision of basic services.  
The first step to rebuilding the Haitian government is to welcome officials back 
into the conversation, since the Haitian people would like their own government to offer 
these basic services (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015). Indeed, the Haitian-led agencies I 
interviewed saw themselves as giving the Haitian government a jump start by already 
managing basic service provisions. Anseye Pou Aytiti encouraged the Ministry of 
Education to come to their schools and learn from their work. In doing so, this 
organization sees its services as not solely benefitting a specific community but rather 
providing models for the entire island. This illustrates the ways in which this endogenous 
organization is focusing its work on the future of Haiti instead of seeking to serve the 
interests of donors. Once the government has been given the time to reconstruct itself 
then nations should begin slowly and carefully diverting funds from NGOs to the state 
with continued support of the goals that the government has created.  
On the community level, capacity building will be more delicate and require 
flexibility and patience. Private and national donors will have to reimagine what their role 
in Haiti is. Some academics in the field have speculated that the large number of aid 
organizations working in Haiti are not working to rebuild Haiti, but instead, using aid as a 
political tactic to manage Haiti (Buss, 2015; Schuller, 2009). If these theories are true, 
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then supporting community members in advocating on their own behalf may not fit the 
‘mission’ of many agencies. For those agencies that present themselves as champions of 
the people they will have to learn how to release control and forge true partnerships in 
order to move Haitian society forward.  
One of the most important roles of Haitian-led agencies has been to support 
communities as they lead projects. As mentioned earlier, organizations that enter 
communities with pre-determined projects may be doing a disservice to community 
members. Allowing community members to identify barriers and methods to overcoming 
those barriers prepares community members to bring change into their communities in a 
way that they may have never thought was possible. As the co-founder of the Haitian-led 
agency Anseye Pou Ayiti explained, “solutions already exists within the community, but 
they have been told over generations that they’re not good enough or that they are ‘poor’ 
or that they are ‘underdeveloped’.” At the core of every NGO is the mission to better the 
current situations of all those whom they encounter. There is no better way to serve that 
mission than by allowing members of communities the chance to create and lead 




Figure 4: Anseye Pou Aytiti class at Ecole La Petite Orchidée in Mirebalais, Haiti 
Source: Emerson Collective  
While donors may only see projects and costs, field staff have the great 
opportunity to see progress and serve generations of the future. A high-ranking staff 
member from World Neighbors may have explained the role of NGOs best: “We do 
long-lasting projects and sustainable projects. That means [community members] need to 
use themselves to develop themselves.” As the staff members of World Neighbors 
underscore, development projects should be more than building wells and schools. 
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Instead, projects should expand the vision of community members, allowing them to see 
past their current situation and empowering them to work towards a common goal.  
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CONCLUSION 
The aid industry has the power to do great things throughout the world. Billions 
of dollars are funneled through these agencies yearly with the intention of alleviating 
some of the harshest conditions around the globe. Recognizing the difficulty of work that 
field staff attempt to do every day, I am sympathetic to the plight of both local 
community members and the agencies that work with them. In an effort to restore 
legitimacy to the work being done by foreign NGOs, I have formulated some 
recommendations that may assist agencies in generating more appropriate and long 
lasting projects throughout Haiti. As mentioned in earlier sections, without having an 
ongoing first-person relationship with the organizations working within Haiti my 
recommendations come from the current literature, interviews with NGOs working 
within Haiti, best practices within the United States, and stories heard from local 
community members while in Haiti last winter.  
POWER DYNAMICS 
While community engagement has seemingly become par for the course in the aid 
industry in Haiti, its sincerity has been questioned by many in both the local aid and 
academic communities. Many have called into question the authenticity of the 
community ‘partnerships’ due to the power dynamics created when one partner has 
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significantly more power and resources. After doing the most thorough research possible 
given the time limitations, it has become apparent that the ability of NGOs to work 
effectively in communities is hampered by the power dynamics created by NGOs in the 
past. As long as NGOs continue to operate as a quasi-government within Haiti their 
projects may never create real impact and aid in the progression of the communities they 
serve. When working with communities, local agencies, and local officials, foreign 
NGOs should strive to shift the balance of power in favor of those who reside within the 
communities they work, allowing community members the ability to choose their own 
projects without fear of being left by the aid agencies.  
OWNERSHIP 
Following the shift in power from those with funding to those with need, NGOs 
should work ​alongside​ communities and other local entities to instill a sense of 
ownership of every project. Communities should not merely be seen as beneficiaries who 
can be either incorporated or ignored depending on the interests of aid agencies. 
Communities are made up of more than just those who live there: there are also state 
agencies, business people, and government officials who work on behalf of the 
community. When reflecting on the lifespan of a relationship, whether between 
individual people or between entities, listening and trust-building could be thought of as 
step one. As we continue to discuss the methods used by different agencies we will be 
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able to create a community “buy-in” map of sorts; creating a best practice formula for 
respectful and empowering collaborations between NGOs and the communities they 
work in. The term ownership must push past the boundary of the project and incorporate 
every stakeholder who is working towards progress in Haiti. 
CAPACITY BUILDING 
Once having established a sense of ownership of projects, capacity building 
should be the main priority of NGOs, local and foreign. If projects cannot grow or even 
survive without funding by the NGO, the project should be considered a failure. By 
aiding in the capacity building of local agencies, local business people, and local 
government, NGOs would be securing Haiti’s ability to recover from natural and 
man-made disasters. NGOs have given themselves the responsibility of maintaining a 
nation that they have no duty to, but, as mentioned earlier, the Haitian people would like 
this responsibility shifted back to their own government. In some sectors such as health 
and education, one version of capacity building is to recruit and educate local residents to 
carry out the mission of the NGOs. Nationally, NGOs such as the Red Cross or 
international agencies such as the United Nations have the opportunity to rebuild the 
Haitian government through mentorship of local officials. It is time for NGOs--regardless 
of size--working in Haiti to break with the current industry trends and refocus their 
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efforts on supporting the Haitian government and Haitian people in building and 
strengthening their capacity. 
While my research focused primarily on NGOs working in Haiti, my findings and 
recommendations are relevant for other countries. NGOs commonly work in countries 
with limited government resources and in communities that usually have not been 
reached by the local government. To those agencies working in countries similar to Haiti, 
my recommendations remain essentially the same; re-examine your role in the 
community, re-examine the power you wield within these communities and countries, 
and re-examine your mission. It is imperative that NGOs continue delivering aid 
wherever there is a need but it is also important that NGOs and the nations that fund them 
allow communities and countries to maintain their identity and dignity.  
My research is by no means conclusive. In the particular case of the role and 
impacts of NGOs in Haiti, there is much more research to be done to understand how to 
best use the funding and time donated by other nations. The road to a Haiti without 
foreign aid is long and fraught with difficulty. It would be in the best interest of Haiti for 
more researchers to examine the current methods of NGOs and the local government in 
an effort to create proper capacity building methods and policies, reconstruct the 
economy to support itself once NGO funding is no longer forthcoming to buttress the 
national budget, and take the necessary steps to enable to Haitian government to offer 
high–quality human services throughout the nation. Haiti has had a rough journey since 
64 
its inception, but throughout all of the hardship the people of Haiti have always managed 
to retain the same fighting spirit that their ancestors had in 1804. This is the same spirit 
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